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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ISABELLA WYSOCKI, JAMES WYSOCKI,
and RACQUEL WYSOCKI,
Plaintiffs,

Civ. No. 2:21-cv-14132 (WJM)

v.
THE WARDLAW-HARTRIDGE SCHOOL,
CHRISTINE CERMINARO, ROBERT M.
BOWMAN, ANDREW WEBSTER, AUSTIN
FORSYTHE, WAGNER COLLEGE, NADIA
VALCOURT, JOHN DOES 1-10, and JANE
DOES 1-10,

OPINION

Defendants.
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
In January of 2021, Plaintiff Isabella Wysocki (“Wysocki”) was a senior high school
student at The Wardlaw-Hartridge School when a video clip circulated of her using a racial
epithet. The school disciplined Wysocki, and she was not permitted to attend in-person
classes or activities for the remainder of the academic year, nor walk in the graduation
ceremony. Wagner College, where Wysocki had signed a National Letter of Intent to play
for the college’s soccer program, likewise rescinded its offer of admission and scholarship.
Wysocki, along with her parents Plaintiffs James and Racquel Wysocki (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”), bring a variety of claims related to the imposed disciplinary actions, alleging
that The Wardlaw-Hartridge School, certain of its administrators, and Wagner College
failed to properly investigate the incident, the video clip’s source, and the motive behind
its circulation. Plaintiffs also name as defendants two students alleged to have
disseminated the clip.
This matter is now before the Court on two motions: a motion to dismiss pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Wagner College, ECF No. 12, and a
motion for partial judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(c) filed by The Wardlaw-Hartridge School and its administrators, Defendants Christine
Cerminaro, Robert Bowman, and Andrew Webster. ECF No. 28. For the reasons set forth
below, Wagner’s motion is GRANTED and Wardlaw and its administrators’ motion is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
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I.

BACKGROUND

The following version of events is derived from Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint and
the exhibits referenced therein and attached thereto. See Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223,
230 (3d Cir. 2010). For the purposes of resolving the instant motions, the Court is bound
to accept Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs. See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008).
A. The Video Clip
Wysocki, age nineteen, is a former student of The Wardlaw-Hartridge School
(“Wardlaw”), a private school in Edison, New Jersey, where she attended ninth through
twelfth grade. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 5. She had been accepted into Wagner College (“Wagner”
or the “college”) in New York and had signed a National Letter of Intent (“NLI”) to play
on the college’s soccer team. See Ex. 20, Am. Compl.
In her senior year at Wardlaw, a video clip of Wysocki using a racial epithet was
circulated and brought to the attention of Wardlaw and Wagner administrators. The
Complaint omits any restatement or complete description of the video’s contents or of
Wysocki’s exact remarks, but the allegations and exhibits suggest the video is a two-second
clip, recorded approximately two years prior to it being circulated, of Wysocki using the
n-word. 1 Wardlaw student Defendant Nadia Valcourt (“Valcourt”) emailed the video clip
to Wagner’s Director of Admissions and the head coach of its soccer program on January
3, 2021. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 14(d). Three days later, the video clip was posted on an
Instagram account called “Wardlaw Uncensored” and then deleted after a few hours. Id. ¶
14(a)-(c). Wardlaw student Defendant Austin Forsythe (“Forsythe”) participated in
creating the account or posting the clip. Another student had overheard Forsythe months
prior saying that he was going to sabotage Wysocki with the video. Id. ¶¶ 10, 14(b) and
(f). On or about January 7, Wysocki and her parents filed an Incident Report with the
Edison Police Department stating that Wardlaw students were harassing Wysocki by
circulating the video. Id. ¶¶ 16, 37; Ex. 4, Am. Compl.
B. Wardlaw’s Investigation
Wardlaw, through its administrators, Defendants Christine Cerminaro, Robert
Bowman, and Andrew Webster, met with or spoke to Wysocki and her parents several
times about the video clip over the next three months. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 15, 17, 21,
1

Wagner submitted to the Court, as an exhibit to its motion to dismiss, a USB flash drive containing a
copy of the video clip file that Wagner received via email. See Bartolomeo Cert. ¶ 2, ECF No. 12-1.
As a motion to dismiss tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading, however, the Court does not
consider or make any determination as to the video’s contents at this juncture.
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28. On one occasion, Wardlaw questioned Wysocki over Zoom and recorded it but did not
notify her parents. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15. On another occasion, Wardlaw required Wysocki to
appear before a “Judging board” comprised of teachers and students but did not allow her
parents or her lawyer to attend the hearing. Id. ¶¶ 21, 25. Wardlaw did not investigate or
hold a similar hearing for Forsythe, Valcourt, or any other students suspected to be
involved with circulating the clip, despite Plaintiffs’ complaints to administrators that
Forsythe and other students were bullying and harassing Wysocki. Id. ¶¶ 17-18, 21.
Wardlaw also did not investigate the video clip’s authenticity, despite Plaintiffs expressing
to administrators that the clip appeared to have been doctored or fabricated. Id. ¶¶ 20, 30.
Wardlaw’s investigation culminated on March 7, 2021, when it sent Wysocki a
formal letter detailing its findings and explaining its decision to discipline her. Id. ¶ 30. A
portion of the letter states:
Two years ago, you should have known better than to use that profanity and
racial epithet in the AP room (or anywhere else for that matter). Now, as a
senior, you should have known once it was posted that you needed to
immediately come forward to an advisor, counselor, or administrator to
acknowledge that the video was real, that your words were hurtful and
unacceptable. You should have expressed deep contrition, and a desire to
apologize meaningfully and repair the harm it caused.
Id. ¶¶ 31, 35; Ex. 22, Am. Compl. Finding that she did not do so, that she “fail[ed] to be
truthful with the Judiciary Board,” and that she had “belatedly taken responsibility and
expressed the desire to learn and make amends,” Wardlaw imposed certain disciplinary
sanctions on Wysocki, but did not expel her. Ex. 22, Am. Compl. Wardlaw prohibited
Wysocki from attending her classes, school events of any kind, and her graduation
ceremony; gave her assignments to complete from home with an altered set of academic
requirements; and required her to see a therapist. Id. If she satisfied these conditions,
Wardlaw would issue her diploma at the end of the school year. Id. Wardlaw and its
administrators penalized Wysocki in other ways throughout the rest of the school year by
withholding her honors and awards and delaying the release of her transcript and letters of
recommendation for college applications. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39, 64.
C. Wagner’s Investigation
On March 12, 2021, several days after Wardlaw issued its disciplinary letter,
Plaintiffs videoconferenced with a Wagner administrator and the head of Wagner’s soccer
program to discuss the video. Id. ¶ 59. Wagner emailed Wysocki on March 19 and again
on March 22, notifying her it was rescinding her Athletics Award Agreement and voiding
the NLI “due to her engaging in serious misconduct.” Am. Compl. ¶ 61; Ex. 20, Am.
Compl. Specifically, “[d]uring the course of [their] meeting on Friday, March 12th,
[Wysocki] admitted to using a racial epithet and that it was her in the video.” Ex. 20, Am.
3
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Compl. According to Plaintiffs, Wagner reached its decision without “an in-depth
investigation of the facts” or “a proper investigation on the reliability of the information
provided by the Wardlaw connected sources, the motives of the sources, their bias, interest,
and corruption.” Am. Compl. ¶ 78.
II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In light of the foregoing events, Plaintiffs commenced this action in the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Union County, Law Division, on July 13, 2021. Notice of Removal
¶ 1, ECF No. 1. Defendants Wardlaw, Christine Cerminaro, Robert Bowman, and Andrew
Webster (collectively, the “Wardlaw Defendants”) timely removed the case, invoking this
Court’s federal question jurisdiction over the action by virtue of Plaintiffs’ federal cause
of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. ¶¶ 7, 10. The Complaint, as
amended, asserts the following twelve claims:
Count I: as to Wardlaw, breach of contract, based on the alleged breaches of
Wysocki’s enrollment contract and the school handbook;
Count II: as to the Wardlaw Defendants collectively, violations of Article 1,
Paragraph 6 of the New Jersey State Constitution, based on the alleged
infringements of Wysocki’s rights to free speech and freedom of association;
Count III: as to all Defendants, negligence or gross negligence, based on the
alleged willful disregard of Wysocki’s constitutional rights under Article 1
of the New Jersey State Constitution;
Count IV: as to the Wardlaw Defendants collectively, violations of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, based on the alleged fostering or tolerance
of a racially discriminatory school environment;
Count V: as to the Wardlaw Defendants and Wagner, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, based on the alleged failure to exercise a duty of care
owed to Wysocki;
Count VI: as to the Wardlaw Defendants collectively, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, based on the alleged conditions and restrictions
imposed on Wysocki;
Count VII: as to the Wardlaw Defendants collectively, violations of the New
Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c), based on the alleged deprivation
of Wysocki’s constitutional rights;

4
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Count VIII: as to the Wardlaw Defendants collectively, fraud, based on the
alleged false representations in the student handbook used to induce students
to enroll at the school;
Count IX: as to Wardlaw, violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act,
N.J.S.A. 56:8-1, et seq., based on the alleged false representations in the
student handbook used to induce students to enroll at the school;
Count X: as to Wardlaw, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing implicit in its enrollment contract;
Count XI: as to Wagner, negligence, based on the alleged failure to
investigate the circumstances surrounding the video clip; and
Count XII: as to Wagner, breach of contract, based on the alleged rescission
of Wysocki’s letter of intent and admission offer. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 88-133.
The Wardlaw Defendants initially answered the Amended Complaint, but later
requested and were granted leave to move for partial judgment on the pleadings. See ECF
Nos. 27, 28. Wagner moved to dismiss. ECF No. 12. Forsythe answered the Amended
Complaint and asserted a crossclaim against all Defendants for contribution and
indemnification. ECF No. 15. As to Valcourt, an Affidavit of Service reflects a copy of
the summons and Amended Complaint was successfully served on a member of her
household on July 19, 2021, but she has not entered an appearance in this case. Ex. C at
4, ECF No. 1-3.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint,
in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Hedges v.
United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c)
provides for similar relief by allowing a party to move for judgment on the pleadings,
though only after the pleadings are closed and early enough not to delay trial. Where, as
here, a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is based on an allegation that the
plaintiff has failed to state a claim, the Court analyzes the motion under the same standards
that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Wolfington v. Reconstructive
Orthopaedic Assocs. II PC, 935 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2019); Turbe v. Gov’t of V.I., 938
F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991).
Accordingly, in adjudicating either motion, the Court must accept “all well-pleaded
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” City of
Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Altisource Asset Mgmt. Corp., 908 F.3d 872, 878 (3d Cir. 2018).
5
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And the Court must “disregard threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, legal
conclusions, and conclusory statements.” Id. at 878-79 (quoting James v. City of WilkesBarre, 700 F.3d 675, 681 (3d Cir. 2012)). The complaint’s factual allegations need not be
detailed, but they must contain sufficient factual matter to raise a plaintiff’s right to relief
above a speculative level, such that it is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Finally, while the Court generally “may not consider matters extraneous to the
pleadings” when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6), or as here, both a Rule 12(b)(6) and a Rule
12(c), motion, In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir.
1997), an exception to this general rule provides that the Court may consider “exhibits
attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic
documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer, 605 F.3d
at 230.
IV.

DISCUSSION
A. Wagner’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

Wagner moves to dismiss the four New Jersey common law claims asserted against
it for failure to state a claim: Count III for the negligent or grossly negligent disregard of
Wysocki’s constitutional rights; Count V for negligent infliction of emotional distress;
Count XI for negligence; and Count XII for breach of contract. See generally Def. Mov.
Br., ECF No. 12-5.
Plaintiffs’ brief in opposition fails to present any substantive legal argument or
analysis in response to the multiple arguments Wagner advances in its moving brief. See
Pls. Opp. Br. at 10-12, ECF No. 17-1. Instead, Plaintiffs haphazardly recite a handful of
paragraphs from the Amended Complaint in an attempt to demonstrate their factual
allegations are sufficient to state a claim. Id. The Court is inclined to find that Plaintiffs
have therefore waived their opportunity to contest Wagner’s arguments but will
nonetheless discuss the arguments briefly and confirm that the counts against Wagner must
be dismissed. See Powell v. Verizon, No. 19-8418, 2019 WL 4597575, at *9 (D.N.J. Sept.
20, 2019) (finding plaintiff conceded arguments where he failed to offer any substantive
arguments in response to a motion to dismiss); O’Neal v. Middletown Twp., No. 18-5269,
2019 WL 77066, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 2, 2019) (finding same); Person v. Teamsters Local
Union 863, No. 12-2293, 2013 WL 5676802, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2013) (“Failure to raise
legal arguments in opposition to a motion to dismiss results in waiver.”).
1. Count III – Negligence or Gross Negligence
6

Case 2:21-cv-14132-WJM-CLW Document 38 Filed 06/16/22 Page 7 of 18 PageID: 683

Where Count II of the Amended Complaint alleges that the Wardlaw Defendants
violated Wysocki’s rights to free speech and freedom of association under Article 1 of the
New Jersey State Constitution, Count III alleges that the deprivation of those rights,
including the deprivation “of her earned and thus vested right to participate in her
graduation ceremony,” the revocation of “her earned and thus vested right to VIP
reservations at said ceremony,” and the “effective expulsion” from Wardlaw “without any
right to be heard administratively or judicially,” constitutes negligence or gross negligence
on the part of all Defendants. Am. Compl. ¶ 97.
Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ reference to Defendants collectively, Plaintiffs have not
alleged facts connecting Wagner to the conduct on which Count III is based. The Amended
Complaint lacks factual allegations showing Wagner had any involvement in decisions
concerning Wysocki’s attendance at her high school classes or graduation ceremony.
Those decisions, as alleged, were strictly within the purview of the Wardlaw Defendants.
Count III therefore fails to state a plausible claim against Wagner and is dismissed as to
Wagner alone.
2. Count XII – Breach of Contract
In Count XII, Plaintiffs allege that the NLI between themselves and Wagner
constituted a binding contract which the college breached by voiding the NLI and
withdrawing the Athletics Award Agreement without first making “any valid serious
inquiry about the truth” in regard to the video clip. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 131-33.
Generally speaking, to state a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege
“(1) a contract between the parties; (2) a breach of that contract; (3) damages flowing
therefrom; and (4) that the party stating the claim performed its own contractual
obligations.” Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 203 (3d Cir. 2007). This inquiry is
ordinarily straightforward: “[t]he Court determines what obligations the parties owed each
other, often by interpreting the express contract, and decides if one party failed to do what
it promised.” Dougherty v. Drew Univ., 534 F. Supp. 3d 363, 373 (D.N.J. 2021).
However, as this Court examined in its recent decision in Powell v. Seton Hall Univ.,
No. 21-13709, 2022 WL 1224959, at *8-9 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2022), ordinary breach of
contract principles do not always provide the most appropriate framework for resolving a
breach of contract dispute between a student and a university. New Jersey courts have
recognized that the relationship between a university and its students often times cannot be
classified as purely contractual and that some deference towards a university’s decisions is
warranted. See Doe v. Princeton Univ., 790 F. App’x 379, 385 (3d Cir. 2019)). As a result,
courts have been reluctant to apply strict contractual principles and have developed and
applied the more unique “substantial departure” standard or the quasi-contract standard to
student-university breach of contract-type disputes. See Powell, 2022 WL 1224959, at *9.
7
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The appropriate standard to apply ultimately depends on the context of the claim.
Dougherty, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 374.
For instance, where a case involves academic dismissal, student misconduct, or the
application of policies in a student manual, courts have typically limited their review of
university action to a consideration of whether (1) the university substantially departed
from its own rules and regulations, (2) the procedures employed by the university were
fundamentally fair, and (3) the university’s decisions were supported by sufficient
evidence. See Keles v. Bender, No. 17-1299, 2021 WL 568105, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 16,
2021); see also Dougherty, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 374 (noting contexts in which courts have
applied the substantial departure standard of review to university action). In addition to
this standard, courts have also applied a quasi-contract standard to issues concerning broad
administrative or business decisions made by a university, such as the closure of a college
or program or the decision to institute remote learning during the Covid-19 pandemic,
asking whether the university’s decision “was arbitrary, made in bad faith, or lacking in
fair notice.” Dougherty, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 375-76; see also Fittipaldi v. Monmouth Univ.,
No. 20-05526, 2021 WL 2210740, at *8-9 (D.N.J. June 1, 2021); Beukas v. Bd. of Trs. of
Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 605 A.2d 776, 783-84 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
The question then is which of the three standards—the ordinary contract standard,
the substantial departure standard, or the quasi-contract standard—provides the most
appropriate framework for analyzing Plaintiffs’ breach of contract dispute with Wagner.
This case does not raise the sort of administrative or business decisions to which the quasicontract standard would apply. And while this case certainly sounds in student misconduct,
Plaintiffs are not alleging that Wagner acted in violation of its own generally applicable
rules or policies, such that the substantial departure standard would apply. Plaintiffs’
breach of contract claim is specifically premised on the NLI between themselves and
Wagner. The Court will therefore apply principles of ordinary contract law in analyzing
their claim. See Powell, 2022 WL 1224959, at *9 (applying principles of ordinary contract
law to plaintiff’s contract claim related to a specific contract between himself and the
university).
Because Plaintiffs attach a copy of Wysocki’s signed NLI and Athletics Award
Agreement to the Amended Complaint, the Court consults the documents directly. See Ex.
20, ECF No. 1-2. The NLI obligates Wagner to provide Wysocki with a written offer of
financial aid for the 2021-2022 academic year in exchange for her enrollment and her
commitment to the college’s soccer program. Id. The accompanying Athletics Award
Agreement delineates the amount of the grant and the conditions Wysocki, as the recipient,
must fulfill and maintain to keep it. Id. By signing the Athletics Award Agreement,
Wysocki acknowledged that she must fulfill Wagner’s and the NCAA’s admissions
requirements and rules for athletics participation. Id. She further acknowledged that the
award may be immediately reduced or canceled if she “engage[s] in serious misconduct
that brings disciplinary action from [Wagner].” Id.
8
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Assuming the NLI and Athletics Award Agreement constitute a binding contract
between the parties, the Amended Complaint lacks any factual allegations tending to show
breach. Plaintiffs do not identify, and the Court cannot discern, any specific terms or
provisions in either of the documents that obligate Wagner to undertake any type of
investigation. Am. Compl. ¶ 78. That Wagner’s efforts to investigate the video resulted
in a decision unfavorable to Wysocki is not the equivalent of showing Wagner breached
some alleged obligation to her. Plaintiffs must identify the specific contractual terms or
provisions that give rise to the obligation, and as they have not done so here, the Court
cannot draw a reasonable inference of liability for breach of contract. See Wingate Inns
Intern., Inc. v. Cypress Centre Hotels, LLC, No. 11-6287, 2012 WL 6625753, at *9 (D.N.J.
Dec. 19, 2012); Eprotec Preservation, Inc. v. Engineered Materials, Inc., No. 10-5097,
2011 WL 867542, at *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 9, 2011) (“Failure to allege the specific provisions of
contracts breached is grounds for dismissal”). Accordingly, Count XII fails to state a claim
against Wagner and is dismissed.
3. Counts V and XI – NIED and Negligence
Count XI alleges that Wagner was negligent and “breach[ed] the duty of care that
[it] owed to [Wysocki]” by “failing seriously to investigate in depth the circumstances” of
the video clip. Am. Comp. ¶ 129. This claim appears to be premised on the same conduct
as Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim against Wagner that the Court dismissed above.
To state a claim for negligence under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must sufficiently
allege: (1) the existence of a duty owed by defendant towards plaintiff; (2) a breach of that
duty by defendant; (3) that defendant’s breach caused plaintiff’s injuries; and (4) that
plaintiff suffered damages as a result. Townsend v. Pierre, 110 A.3d 52, 61 (N.J. 2015).
The threshold inquiry is whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, the
existence of which is generally a matter of law. Leonard v. Golden Touch Transp. of N.Y.
Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 640, 644 (D.N.J. 2015).
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Wagner, “as a learning institution” concerned with the
“issues of truth, free thought, and free speech,” owed a duty to Wysocki and her parents to
undertake a “non-negligent investigation.” Am. Compl. ¶ 78. Plaintiffs allege that a
“proper investigation” would have entailed Wagner considering the “reliability of the
information provided by the Wardlaw connected sources, the motives of the sources, their
bias, interest, and corruption.” Id.
As to the element of duty, Plaintiffs offer no substantive legal argument in response
to Wagner’s motion to dismiss and thus have not identified any New Jersey laws
recognizing a duty of care owed by a private university stemming from its decision to
rescind an admission offer or scholarship. And even if Plaintiffs had pleaded a legally
cognizable duty, the sole factual allegation against Wagner in the 133-paragraph Amended
9
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Complaint—that Wagner did not consider Wardlaw’s reliability, motives, bias, interest,
and corruption when it decided to void Wysocki’s NLI—is an accusation that explains little
about what Wagner allegedly did or did not do and how that ultimately affected its
decision-making. This is particularly evident in the face of Wagner’s email to Wysocki
explaining that, at the videoconference, she had “admitted to using a racial epithet and that
it was her in the video,” which Wagner found to be serious misconduct in violation of her
Athletics Award Agreement. 2 Ex. 20, Am. Compl. Absent sufficient factual allegations
tending to show Wagner owed Plaintiffs a legal duty and Wagner breached that duty, the
Court cannot find that Plaintiffs have stated a cognizable claim for negligence against
Wagner. Count XI is therefore dismissed. 3
Count V against the Wardlaw Defendants and Wagner for negligent infliction of
emotional distress (“NIED”) is likewise dismissed as to Wagner alone. A claim for direct
NIED requires a plaintiff to sufficiently allege that the defendant owed a duty of reasonable
care to the plaintiff, that the defendant breached that duty, and that the breach proximately
caused plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress. G.D. v. Kenny, 984 A.2d 921, 933 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009), aff’d, 15 A.3d 300 (N.J. 2011). Without sufficient factual
allegations tending to show duty or breach on Wagner’s part, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim
for NIED against Wagner. At this point, all claims against Wagner have been dismissed.

2

To be clear, the Amended Complaint appears to assert alternative theories concerning the video clip—
that it was doctored or fabricated, but that Wysocki’s use of the racial epithet was nonetheless an
exercise of free speech. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14(d), 20. Plaintiffs specifically allege that they
advised the Wardlaw Defendants that the clip appeared to be doctored or fabricated, but they do not
allege that they raised this concern with Wagner. See id. ¶¶ 20, 30.
3

In dismissing Count XI on the grounds that it fails to state a claim, the Court does not reach Wagner’s
argument that it is immune from liability for negligence under New Jersey’s Charitable Immunity Act,
N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7. See Def. Mov. Br. at 16-18, ECF No. 12-5. Wagner assumes that as a not-forprofit entity it is entitled to the protections of the statute, but as an out-of-state institution, it is not
abundantly clear that is so. See, e.g., Feniello v. Univ. of Pennsylvania Hosp., 558 F. Supp. 1365, 1368
(D.N.J. 1983) (holding that the Act was inapplicable to a Pennsylvania hospital, even where the
hospital may have provided substantial services to a New Jersey resident, because it was incorporated
in Pennsylvania and performed all of its functions therein; New Jersey thus did not have a great interest
in applying its own law to protect an out-of-state corporation, “especially at the expense of a New
Jersey resident plaintiff.”). Wagner represents that it is a New York college that “operates outside of
the State of New Jersey,” has “no formal or informal relationship with New Jersey,” and “is not subject
to direct regulation by New Jersey.” Def. Reply at 9-10, ECF No. 18. Moreover, unlike New Jersey,
Wagner’s home state of New York does not recognize charitable immunity. Gilbert v. Seton Hall
Univ., 332 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Although New York . . . once recognized charitable
immunity, [it] abolished the doctrine long before the events giving rise to this suit.”); see also Walker
v. Young Life Saranac Vill., No. 10-1578, 2012 WL 5880682, at *12 n.39 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012).
Absent any analysis on this issue by either party, however, the Court makes no determination as to
whether the Charitable Immunity Act applies here to immunize Wagner from liability.

10

Case 2:21-cv-14132-WJM-CLW Document 38 Filed 06/16/22 Page 11 of 18 PageID: 687

B. The Wardlaw Defendants’ Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings
The Court turns next to the Wardlaw Defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion for partial
judgment on the pleadings. On this motion, the Wardlaw Defendants seek dismissal of
each of the following counts for failure to state a claim: Count I for breach of contract;
Count VI for intentional infliction of emotional distress; Count VII for violations of the
New Jersey Civil Rights Act; Count VIII for common law fraud; Count IX for violations
of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act; and Count X for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. See generally Defs. Mov. Br., ECF No. 28-1. Plaintiffs’
brief in opposition again fails to present substantive legal arguments in response. See Pls.
Opp. Br. at 11-17, ECF No. 29.
1. Ripeness of the Rule 12(c) Motion
Plaintiffs devote much of their brief in opposition to arguing, as a threshold matter,
that the Wardlaw Defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion is procedurally improper because the
pleadings are not closed. See id. at 2-10. Wagner has yet to file an answer due to its
pending motion to dismiss and Valcourt has yet to enter an appearance and respond to the
Amended Complaint filed eleven months ago. Nonetheless, the Wardlaw Defendants’
Rule 12(c) motion is addressed to claims for which the pleadings have closed, as these
claims are specifically alleged against only the Wardlaw Defendants, who have already
filed an Answer in response. See, e.g., EMD Performance Materials Corp. v. Marque of
Brands Ams. LLC, No. 21-3050, 2022 WL 62532, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2022) (treating a
Rule 12(c) motion as ripe, even where a Rule 12(b)(6) motion was pending, “because the
issues to be decided on the Rule 12(c) motion have been joined in the pleadings and there
will be no prejudice to either party in consideration of the motion”). This is not an instance
where the disposition of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion would affect the composition of
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint in a significant way as to all of the parties, thereby making
it imprudent to consider the Rule 12(c) motion contemporaneously. See, e.g., Mulheron v.
Philadelphia Eagles, No. 12-1753, 2013 WL 211349, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 18, 2013) (treating
defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion as untimely where co-defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion was
still pending and would “affect the composition of the Plaintiff’s complaint in a significant
way as to all of the parties”). Indeed, even with the claims against Wagner having been
dismissed on the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the claims against the remaining Defendants are
undisturbed. Thus, under these circumstances, in the absence of a showing of prejudice to
any party, and for purposes of judicial efficiency, the Court will treat the Wardlaw
Defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion as ripe for adjudication.
2. Count I – Breach of Contract
Count I of the Amended Complaint alleges that Wardlaw breached its enrollment
contract with Plaintiffs by violating the terms of its Student-Parent Handbook (the
11
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“Handbook”). Am. Compl. ¶ 89. Plaintiffs attached only certain pages of the Handbook
to the Amended Complaint and did not attach the Enrollment Contract. See Ex. 10, ECF
No. 1-2. Plaintiffs allege that by signing the enrollment contract, they agreed to read the
Handbook, thereby incorporating its provisions into the contract. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51, 89.
Wardlaw argues that the breach of contract claim fails because the Handbook is not a
contract but merely offers students guidelines by which to abide. Defs. Mov. Br. at 7, ECF
No. 28-1.
As stated previously, a straightforward breach of contract claim requires a plaintiff
to sufficiently allege the existence of a contract, that defendant breached that contract, and
that damages flowed therefrom. Frederico, 507 F.3d at 203. Here, Plaintiffs fail to
adequately plead the first element of their claim. Their allegation that the Handbook is
incorporated into the enrollment contract because they attested to having read the
Handbook is too tenuous to support an inference that its provisions create contractual
obligations. Under an ordinary breach of contract theory then, Plaintiffs have not pleaded
a plausible claim against Wardlaw.
Setting aside Plaintiffs’ strict characterization of the claim as one for breach of
contract, the gravamen of the claim and of the Complaint as a whole is that Wardlaw failed
to follow its own disciplinary policies and procedures. In considering such a claim, the
Court is guided by two decisions from the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division:
Hernandez v. Don Bosco Preparatory High, 730 A.2d 365 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)
and B.S. v. Noor-Ul-Iman Sch., A-4905-13T2, 2016 WL 4145921 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Aug. 5, 2016). In Hernandez, the Appellate Division considered what procedural
protections a private high school must afford its students upon disciplinary expulsion. 730
A.2d at 373. The court held that a private high school, when expelling a student for
misconduct, must: (1) “adhere to its own established procedures for dismissal”; and (2) in
carrying out the dismissal, “follow a procedure that is fundamentally fair.” Id. at 376. The
Appellate Division, albeit in an unpublished decision, later extended the application of this
two-pronged analysis to discipline by a private school that stopped short of expulsion, such
as where the student is removed from school and made to complete assignments from home
without in-home instruction while the school undertakes a lengthy investigation lasting the
rest of the school year. Noor-Ul-Iman Sch., 2016 WL 4145921, at *3, 6. There, the court
held that to state a claim against a private school for improperly exercising a disciplinary
policy, a plaintiff must allege facts that, if true, satisfy the Hernandez standard. Id. at *6.
“[A] plaintiff must allege the school either failed to ‘adhere to its own established
[disciplinary] procedures’ or, in carrying out the discipline, failed to ‘follow a procedure
that is fundamentally fair.’” Id. (quoting Hernandez, 730 A.2d at 376).
Under this standard, the Court finds that the Amended Complaint, though not a
model of clarity, includes enough factual allegations which, if assumed to be true and
viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, suggest that Wardlaw failed to adhere to
its established policies and acted in an unfair manner when disciplining Wysocki. A brief
12
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look at some of the Handbook’s provisions is useful here. One of the Handbook’s sections
addresses “Behavioral Expectations” and “provides the academic and behavioral rules and
guidelines by which the school expects its students to abide.” Ex. 10 at 15, Am. Compl.
The section iterates that Wardlaw “will not tolerate verbal, physical, texting or other online
conduct” that bullies or harasses any member of the school community. Id. at 17, 24-25;
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 53-54. The section further states, in relevant part:
In most instances[,] complaints of harassment or bullying by a member of
our community will be dealt with directly by the administration. If deemed
necessary, a special committee of faculty and staff will be appointed by the
Head of School for thorough and prompt investigation.
The administration or the committee will consider all related information in
determining whether the alleged improper conduct occurred and whether that
conduct constitutes harassment or bullying.
Ex. 10 at 15, Am. Compl. When disciplinary action is warranted, Wardlaw’s policy
is that the “internal punishment should be commensurate to the violation.” 4 Id.; Am.
Compl. ¶ 52. Plaintiffs allege that Wardlaw failed to adhere to these policies and engaged
in a fundamentally unfair process by questioning Wysocki and recording the questioning
without first notifying her parents; by failing to investigate the instances of bullying and
harassment that Plaintiffs reported to Wardlaw in relation to the circulation of the video
clip; by failing to consider the context of the video clip or Plaintiffs’ contentions that the
clip was doctored or fabricated; and by excessively disciplining Wysocki in prohibiting her
from classes, school activities, and graduation, and withholding her honors, awards,
transcript, and letters of recommendation for college applications. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39,
45, 52-54, 56, 64. While discovery will ultimately determine whether Plaintiffs can
substantiate their version of the events, the Court finds they have satisfied their burden at
this early stage and have pleaded enough to state a claim against Wardlaw under Count I
for breach of the Handbook’s policies and procedures. Count I therefore survives the
Wardlaw Defendants’ motion and may proceed.
3. Count VI – IIED
Count VI alleges that the Wardlaw Defendants are liable for intentional infliction of
emotional distress (“IIED”). The crux of the claim is that the Wardlaw Defendants’
imposition of disciplinary sanctions, along with their restricting or delaying the release of
her transcripts and letters of recommendation, destroyed Wysocki’s future and resulted in
her suffering “anxiety attacks, mental distress, post-traumatic effects, and psychiatric
4

The Court acknowledges the somewhat vague nature of these provisions; however, because Plaintiffs
have attached only certain pages of the Handbook to their Amended Complaint, the Court is unable to
determine whether more precise disciplinary procedures are detailed further therein.
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injury.” See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 48-50, 109-10. The Wardlaw Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’
allegations, even if assumed to be true, do not give rise to the kind of extreme and
outrageous conduct required to sustain a claim for IIED. The Court agrees.
To state a plausible claim for IIED, Plaintiffs “must plead, among other things, that
Defendants’ conduct was extreme and outrageous.” Gok v. Ports Am., Inc., No. 15-3468,
2015 WL 4915518, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2015) (citing Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund
Soc., 544 A.2d 857, 863 (N.J. 1988)). Plaintiffs have not pleaded facts that satisfy this
standard. The Wardlaw Defendants’ alleged conduct in disciplining Wysocki simply does
not rise to the level of “conduct so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to
go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community.” Witherspoon v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 173 F. Supp.
2d 239, 242 (D.N.J. 2001) (quoting Buckley, 544 A.2d at 863); see also Doe v. Rider Univ.,
No. 16-4882, 2018 WL 466225, at *18 (D.N.J. Jan. 17, 2018) (“One will not satisfy the
[IIED] elements by merely demonstrating a defendant acted ‘unjust, unfair, and unkind.’”).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against the Wardlaw Defendants for
IIED and Count VI is dismissed.
4. Count VII – Violations of the NJCRA
Count VII alleges that the Wardlaw Defendants violated the New Jersey Civil
Rights Act (“NJCRA”), N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 112-13. As the Wardlaw
Defendants argue, and Plaintiffs agree, this claim must be dismissed because the Wardlaw
Defendants are not state actors within the meaning of the statute. Defs. Mov. Br. at 9, ECF
No. 28-1; Pls. Opp. Br. at 15, ECF No. 29; see Hottenstein v. City of Seal Isle City, 793 F.
Supp. 2d 688, 694 (D.N.J. 2011) (dismissing NJCRA claim because defendants were not
state actors); Cottrell v. Zagami, LLC, No. 08-3340, 2010 WL 2652229, at *4 (D.N.J. June
23, 2010) (“[The] NJCRA does not permit[] private suits against private persons absent
state action.”). Count VII is therefore dismissed with prejudice.
5. Count VIII – Fraud
Count VIII alleges that Wardlaw Defendants are liable for fraud because the
Handbook’s policies on discipline, harassment, bullying, awards and recognition, and the
exercise of free speech were misrepresentations used to induce Plaintiffs to enroll Wysocki
into Wardlaw. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 73-75, 115-16. The Wardlaw Defendants argue that
Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded that the Wardlaw Defendants misrepresented its
policies or that Plaintiffs reasonably relied on those policies when enrolling Wysocki in
the school. Defs. Mov. Br. at 12-14, ECF No. 28-1.
“[A] party is fraudulently induced to enter into an agreement when ‘a knowing
misstatement has been made, on the basis of which the defrauded party signs the
instrument.’” State Capital Title & Abstract Co. v. Pappas Bus. Servs., LLC, 646 F. Supp.
14
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2d 668, 681 (D.N.J. 2009) (quoting Metex Mfg. Corp. v. Manson, No. 05-2948, 2008 WL
877870, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2008)). To state a cognizable claim for fraudulent
inducement, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts showing that the defendant made a
material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact, which was false and known
to be false when made, made for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to rely on it, and the
plaintiff did reasonably rely on it, resulting in damages. Ceballo v. Mac Tools, Inc., No.
11-4634, 2011 WL 4736356, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2011).
Beyond the basic elements needed to plead a fraudulent inducement claim, a
plaintiff asserting such claim must also satisfy the heightened pleading requirements
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). J.H. Reid Gen. Contractor v. Conmaco/Rector,
L.P., No. 08-6034, 2010 WL 398486, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2010). Rule 9(b) requires a
plaintiff to “state the circumstances of the alleged fraud with sufficient particularity to place
the defendant on notice of the ‘precise misconduct with which [it is] charged.’” Frederico,
507 F.3d at 200 (quoting Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2004)).
Here, Plaintiffs allege that the Wardlaw Defendants represented, through the
policies outlined in the Handbook, that they would discipline students in a manner
commensurate to the violation; that they would not tolerate bullying, cyberbullying,
harassment, or discrimination; and that they would promote free speech and thinking
among students. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 73-75. Plaintiffs further allege that “[t]hese
representations were made and continued to be made to [P]laintiffs with knowledge of their
falsity” because Wardlaw, among other acts, “permitted the creation of a race-based group
of black students” and disciplined Wysocki in the manner that it did without also
disciplining the students who circulated the video clip and harassed her. Id. ¶¶ 74-75.
Plaintiffs explain in their brief in opposition that “[t]he falsity of [the] representations
became apparent when on opportunity to apply them the school did not seek to apply them
to the reverse racist perpetrator that doctored the clip.” Pls. Opp. Br. at 16, ECF No. 29.
Plaintiffs’ allegations posit nothing more than that the Wardlaw Defendants
allegedly did not adhere to their own policies—conduct which Plaintiffs already seek to
recover for under a breach of contract theory. That the Wardlaw Defendants breached
some future promise to Plaintiffs is not the equivalent of the Wardlaw Defendants
knowingly misstating the Handbook provisions at the time Plaintiffs enrolled Wysocki in
school in order to induce them into enrolling. See CDK Glob., LLC v. Tulley Auto. Grp.,
Inc., 489 F. Supp. 3d 282, 305 (D.N.J. 2020), recons. denied, No. 15-3103, 2021 WL
1187123 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2021) (“Fraud is a far narrower theory than breach of contract;
it does not cover an ordinary breach of promise about future events.”). The Amended
Complaint fails to include coherent factual allegations tending to show the latter scenario.
For these reasons, Plaintiffs have not stated a plausible claim against the Wardlaw
Defendants for fraudulent inducement and Count VIII is dismissed.
6. Count IX – Violations of the NJCFA
15
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Count IX alleges that Wardlaw violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act
(“NJCFA”), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1, et seq., based on the same alleged misrepresentations that
underlie the fraudulent inducement claim. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 121-25.
To state a claim under the NJCFA, “a plaintiff must allege that the defendant
engaged in an unlawful practice that caused an ascertainable loss to the plaintiff.”
Frederico, 507 F.3d at 202 (citing Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 454, 462-65
(N.J. 1994)). Like their claim for fraudulent inducement, Plaintiffs’ claim for violation of
the NJCFA is subject to Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements. See Vita v. Vita,
No. 21-11060, 2022 WL 376764, at *6 (D.N.J. Feb. 8, 2022).
Wardlaw argues that Plaintiffs have not pleaded facts showing either an unlawful
practice or ascertainable loss. Defs. Mov. Br. at 15, ECF No. 28-1. There are three general
categories of unlawful practices within the meaning of the NJCFA: affirmative acts,
knowing omissions, and violations of specific regulations promulgated under the statute.
Frederico, 507 F.3d at 202. Plaintiffs’ allegations that Wardlaw made affirmative
misrepresentations in its Handbook as part of a fraudulent business practice to reach
consumers falls within the first category of affirmative acts. See Am. Compl. ¶ 123. The
alleged misrepresentations, however, are insufficient to state a claim under the NJCFA. As
the Court explained in its analysis of Plaintiffs’ fraudulent inducement claim, the alleged
misrepresentations concerning the Handbook’s policies merely constitute Wardlaw’s
alleged failure to adhere to its own policies and procedures, which Plaintiffs seek to recover
for under a breach of contract theory. See Vita, 2022 WL 376764, at *5 (dismissing NJCFA
claim because “the alleged misrepresentations . . . merely constitute a breach of the contract
between the parties”); Hunt Constr. Group, Inc. v. Hun Sch. of Princeton, No. 08-03550,
2009 WL 1312591, at *6 (D.N.J. May 11, 2009) (dismissing NJCFA counterclaim because
defendant merely alleged that “[plaintiff] failed to abide by its obligations under the
contract”).
Additionally, Plaintiffs have not adequately pleaded an ascertainable loss to
establish a cause of action under the NJCFA. Under the statute, “[a]n ascertainable loss is
a loss that is quantifiable or measurable; it is not hypothetical or illusory.” Hammer v.
Vital Pharm., Inc., No. 11-4124, 2012 WL 1018842, at *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2012) (quoting
Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., L.L.C., 4 A.3d 561, 576 (N.J. 2010)) (quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs’ bare, unsupported allegation that “[t]he damages to Plaintiffs are ascertainable”
misses the mark. See Am. Compl. ¶ 125. Having failed to plead facts showing an unlawful
practice and ascertainable loss, Plaintiffs have not stated a cognizable claim against
Wardlaw for violation of the NJCFA. Count IX is dismissed.
7. Count X – Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing
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Finally, Count X alleges that Wardlaw breached the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 126-27. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not pleaded
factual allegations to support the elements of their claim, nor can they base their claim on
the same set of facts giving rise to their breach of contract claim. Defs. Br. at 16, ECF No.
28-1.
“To establish a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a plaintiff must
show that ‘the party alleged to have acted in bad faith has engaged in some conduct that
denied the benefit of the bargain originally intended by the parties.’” T.J. McDermott
Transp. Co., Inc. v. Cummins, Inc., No. 14-4209, 2015 WL 1119475, at *13 (D.N.J. Mar.
11, 2015) (quoting Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assoc.,
864 A.2d 387, 396 (N.J. 2005)). “[C]ourts have repeatedly recognized that ‘a plaintiff
cannot maintain a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
when . . . the cause of action arises out of the same conduct underlying the alleged breach
of contract.’” Elite Pers. Inc. v. PeopleLink, LLC, No. 15-1173, 2015 WL 3409475, at *3
(D.N.J. May 27, 2015) (quoting Hahn v. OnBoard LLC, No. 09-3639, 2009 WL 4508580,
at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2009)).
The Court cannot discern coherent factual allegations supporting Plaintiffs’ bare
assertion that “Wardlaw violated and breached the implied covenant[] of good and faith
and fair dealing and caused proximate[] damages” to Plaintiffs. See Am. Compl. ¶ 127.
And Plaintiffs’ argument in their brief in opposition “refer[ring] the Court to [their] answer
to Count I” to demonstrate “there was a contract of which the handbook was [a part of]”
and “there was a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing” does nothing to
clarify their claim. Pls. Opp. Br. at 17, ECF No. 29. Plaintiffs, therefore, have not stated
a plausible claim against Wardlaw for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Count X is dismissed.
V.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Wagner’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, ECF No.
12, is GRANTED and the Wardlaw Defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion for partial judgment
on the pleadings, ECF No. 28, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
All claims against Wagner—Counts III, V, XI, and XII—are DISMISSED for
failure to state a claim. Counts VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X against Wardlaw or the Wardlaw
Defendants collectively are likewise DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. The claims
are dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE, except as to Count VII, which is dismissed
WITH PREJUDICE. Count I survives the Wardlaw Defendants’ motion and may
proceed.
The remaining operative claims in the Amended Complaint are therefore as follows:
Count I as to Wardlaw; Count II as to the Wardlaw Defendants; Count III as to the Wardlaw
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Defendants, Forsythe, and Valcourt; Count IV as to the Wardlaw Defendants; and Count
V as to the Wardlaw Defendants.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
Date: June 16, 2022
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